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From the fifteenth and early part of the sixteenth centuries on-
ward, common law courts lost prominence as newer courts began to
exercise jurisdiction over matters that had once been in the exclusive
domain of the common law courts. The reduction in common law ju-
risdiction was so severe that one historian wrote, "Had the common
law courts continued to dwindle and have found no effective ways of
attracting back business, then the chancery and conciliar courts would
have dealt with the bulk of the legal work throughout the country."'
Common law courts fought against this decline (and their own
demise) by developing ways to enlarge the scope of their jurisdiction
and attract litigation that might have gone elsewhere.2 Many historians
have discussed the struggle to retain jurisdiction by common law
courts as a product of the fact that it is a common error among courts
to value their own justice over the justice delivered by other institu-
tions. These historians have dismissed the use of legal fictions by
common law courts and stated that common law judges were alarmed
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1 Marjorie Blatcher, The Court of Kings Bench 1450-1550: A Study in Self-help vii, 32
(Athlone 1978) (investigating the workings of the King's Bench and finding "an unsatisfactory
little court seemingly in decline but not without portents of recovery").
2 The courts developed the writ of latitat and the so-called Bill of Middlesex to fend off
jurisdictional challenges of the courts of equity, and they used writs of prohibition and then the
Parliamentary sanction to limit the jurisdiction of (and competition from) the Court of Star
Chamber and Court of Requests, which attracted litigants by respectively providing a "less costly,
less hazardous, and more expeditious" forum and "more intelligent and cheaper procedure." I.S.
Leadam, ed, Select Cases Before the King's Council in the Star Chamber Commonly Called the
Court of Star Chamber: A.D. 1477-1509 lxviii (Selden Society 1903); I.S. Leadam, ed, Select Cases
in the Court of Requests:A.D. 1497-1569 xlvi (Selden Society 1898).
The techniques common law courts developed were not merely procedural tricks but in-
volved legal fictions that actually changed substantive law. For example, in contract cases, com-
mon law courts expanded the medieval writ of assumpsit and presumed the existence of a prom-
ise from the fact of a debt to allow debts to be recovered in common law courts, even though
such actions would otherwise fall outside of the court's jurisdiction. See W.S. Holdsworth, 3 A
History of English Law 443 (Little, Brown 3d ed 1923). See, for example, Slade's Case, 4 Coke
Report 92b, 76 ER 1074 (KB 1602) (presuming existence of a promise from the fact of a debt
and allowing assumpsit to be brought on a simple promise to pay money).
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"by the loss of business which the development of the law in the
King's Bench was causing."3
Despite its widespread acceptance, the suggestion that common
law judges restricted non-common law courts merely to preserve their
own jurisdiction is not supported by direct evidence. This evidentiary
silence is not surprising given the reluctance of judges to admit that
they acted for reasons outside the law. Nor is the silence fatal-it
makes sense to conclude that judges tried to increase their power and
incomes by expanding their courts' jurisdiction-particularly because
judicial salaries were taken from court fees.
But the fact that the lack of evidence can be rationalized does not
mean that the current theories of judicial self-aggrandizement should
be accepted blindly. The only way to know whether these theories are
correct is to analyze case law-and what judges actually did-during
this period. Closer examination of what the common law courts actu-
ally did will provide better evidence of what motivated common law
judges.
To that end, this Comment examines seamen's wage and hy-
pothecation cases from after the English Revolution until around
1800.4 These cases are interesting because they undermine the theory
that common law courts were only concerned with protecting their
own jurisdiction Common law courts often allowed Admiralty courts
to exercise jurisdiction over seamen's wage and hypothecation cases,
even when Admiralty jurisdiction was formally precluded by statute.6
An examination of seamen's wage and hypothecation cases sug-
gests that common law courts did not myopically cling to their own ju-
risdiction without considering the benefits of their non-common law
counterparts. Rather, as Charles Gray described of this period,
it was more deeply federalistic [and] ... [j]urisdiction was taken
more seriously ... because the mixed character of the system was
3 A.W.B. Simpson, A History of the Common Law of Contract. The Rise of the Action of
Assumpsit 291 (Oxford 1975);'Theodore FT. Plucknett, A Concise History of the Common Law
644-45 (Butterworth 5th ed 1956).
4 Webster's Third New International Dictionary defines "hypothecate" as "to pledge
without delivery of title or possession; to pledge (a ship) by a bottomry [a contract in the nature
of a mortgage] bond." Philip Babcock Gove, ed, Webster's Third New International Dictionary
1117 (Merriam-Webster 1986). See Part L.A for a description of hypothecation.
5 For example, in Benzen v Jeffries, 1 Lord Raymond 152, 91 Eng Rep 999 (KB 1697), a
common law court held that the Admiralty court, not the common law court, was the proper
court to hear a case regarding hypothecation-even though the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act (dis-
cussed in Part I.B) provided strong grounds for rejecting Admiralty jurisdiction.
6 For a general discussion of common law preservation of Admiralty jurisdiction, see Part
II. See, for example, Ross v Walker, 2 Wilson Rep 264 (KB 1795) (allowing pilot to bring suit in
Admiralty court to recover wages); Menetone v Gibbons, 3 Term Rep 267,100 Eng Rep 568 (KB




perceived as an essential and legitimate feature of it [and t]he
common law [had] ... a special trust to keep all parts, including
itself in proper channels.
7
Ultimately, these cases indicate that common law judges may have
seen themselves as stewards of an intertwined and complex judicial
system, rather than as zealous adherents to the common law courts on
which they served.
The social and political environment in which common law courts
were operating emphasized the importance of encouraging English
industry and commerce. The framework that common law courts de-
veloped to preserve Admiralty jurisdiction supported contemporary
maritime business practices and helped distribute the costs created by
the unique structure of maritime relationships. Taken together, these
factors suggest that common law judges-though perhaps not explic-
itly concerned with efficiency-were cognizant of their role in facili-
tating productive economic relationships.!
This Comment's examination of seamen's wage and hypotheca-
tion cases is intended to contribute to current understanding about
the relationship between English common law and non-common law
courts. It is meant to inspire, at the very least, a moment of hesitation
about the widespread assumption that English judges merely wanted
to expand the scope of their own jurisdiction.
Part I describes the structure of maritime relationships and ex-
plains why seamen's wage and hypothecation cases fell outside the
statutorily defined scope of Admiralty jurisdiction. Part II describes
the framework common law courts developed to preserve Admiralty
jurisdiction in seamen's wage and hypothecation cases. And Part III
7 Charles Gray, 1 The Writ of Prohibition: Jurisdiction in Early Modem English Law xv
(Oceana 1994).
8 The purpose of this Comment is limited to describing one aspect of the relationship be-
tween common law and Admiralty courts during the period from after the English Revolution
until the nineteenth century. To the extent that this paper employs economic concepts, it provides
a positive rather than a normative analysis of law. It attempts to "explain legal rules and out-
comes as they are rather than to change them to make them better." Richard A. Posner, Eco-
nomic Analysis of Law 27 (Little, Brown 5th ed 1998) (explaining the difference between posi-
tive and normative analysis of law).
Additionally, this Comment does not make broader claims about the U.S. legal system. In
some sense, seamen's wage and hypothecation cases endow pragmatic, efficiency arguments with
a historical pedigree and demonstrate that fostering productive business relationships was an
important goal of the common law courts from which our own system evolved.
It may be possible to use this argument to make broader claims about the legitimacy and
importance of pragmatic concerns in the U.S. system. However, it would take direct evidence, not
provided in this Comment, to make these claims. Though the U.S. system evolved from the Brit-
ish common law system, some of the features of the former-most notably, Admiralty jurisdic-
tion-were reactions to, rather than extensions of the English common law system.
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examines why common law courts preserved Admiralty jurisdiction at
the expense of their own jurisdiction.
I. THE STATUTORY PURVIEW OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER
MARITIME RELATIONSHIPS
England began an intense phase of international expansion dur-
ing the Elizabethan age and the seventeenth century. By the end of
the eighteenth century, England had colonies all over the world. Eng-
lish merchants profited from this development by exploiting interna-
tional trade routes. The English Parliament strove to "encourage[ ] ...
British shipping, and ... preserv[e] ... the colonial markets for Great
Britain in such a way that the commercial interests both of the colo-
nies and of Great Britain were secured."'
A. The Unique Structure of Maritime Relationships
Maritime relationships reflected the extensive international sys-
tem of which they were a part. Unlike most other business relation-
ships in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, maritime relation-
ships were not based on tightly-knit family and community connec-
tions.'° Instead, they involved the complete separation of ownership,
management, and work, and were established by contracts rather than
by more general moral or social sentiments.1
Ship owners participated little, if at all, in their ships' upkeep or
voyages. Owners generally contracted with masters who took respon-
sibility for every aspect of a ship. Masters hired and supervised sea-
men and other service providers, made sure ships were in good repair,
obtained provisions, and oversaw voyages.
To complete their responsibilities, masters frequently entered into
contracts on behalf of ship owners. Masters entered into wage con-
tracts to secure labor for voyages and into sales and service contracts
for repairs and provisions. Additionally, masters had the authority to
pledge owners' ships as collateral for securing loans. This authority,
9 William Holdsworth, 11 A History of English Law 407 (Little Brown 1938) (discussing
the impact of the Navigation Act on English commerce and industry).
10 For a discussion of the connection between separated business relationships and a con-
tract regime, see Grant Gilmore, The Death of Contract (Ohio 1974). For a description of the ef-
fects of more close-knit and local interactions, see Robert C Ellickson, Order Without Law: How
Neighbors Settle Disputes (Harvard 1991).
11 The phrase "separated ownership, management, and work" invokes a concept that Al-
fred Chandler used in his history of the development of business and industry. Chandler used the
phrase to refer to corporate business relationships that developed during the middle of the nine-
teenth century and replaced smaller, localized family businesses. Though the correlation may not
be perfect, for the purposes of this model, ship owners are owners, masters are managers, and
mates and mariners are producers. See Alfred D. Chandler, Jr., The Visible Hand The Managerial
Revolution innAmerican Business 9,87 (Belknap 1977).
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called "hypothecation," was important because it provided a way for
masters to obtain money for necessary provisions and services when
they could not contact ships' owners for more funds." Hypothecation
was particularly necessary when, for instance, a ship was delayed or
damaged by inclement weather, hijacked by pirates, or merely un-
equipped for the unprecedented distances to England's far-off colo-
nies.
B. Admiralty Court Jurisdiction over Seamen's Wage and
Hypothecation Cases
The contract structure that served as the basis for maritime rela-
tionships also, rather ironically, threatened to take these relationships
outside the purview of Admiralty court jurisdiction. Admiralty courts
had exercised wide and vaguely defined jurisdiction over maritime
cases during the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. 3 However, by the
end of the eighteenth century, these courts had been largely "confined
to contracts and things exclusively made and done upon the high
seas."'"
The most important limitation on Admiralty jurisdiction was the
Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1389 ("Act"), which limited Admiralty
jurisdiction to "thing[s] done upon the sea."'5 The Act had the poten-
tial to eliminate Admiralty jurisdiction completely in seamen's wage
12 For example, in Menetone v Gibbons, the master of a ship hypothecated a ship to indi-
viduals for "setting her forth to sea, and for furnishing and providing her with victuals" 3 Term
Rep 267,267,100 Eng Rep 568 (KB 1789).
13 During the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, as international trade and interest in the
navy increased, Admiralty courts exercised wide and vaguely defined jurisdiction over criminal
and civil matters and prize cases. Admiralty court jurisdiction extended over all contracts made
abroad, bills of exchange, commercial agencies abroad, charter parties, insurance, non-delivery of
or damage to cargo, negligent navigation, and breach of warranty of seaworthiness and other
charter provisions. In addition, the court exercised jurisdiction over various torts committed on
the sea, in public rivers, over cases of collision, salvage, fishermen, harbors and rivers, and occa-
sionally over matters transacted abroad, but otherwise outside the scope of Admiralty jurisdic-
tion. For a general discussion, see Holdsworth, 11 A History of English Law (cited in note 9).
14 See De Lovio v Boit, 7 F Cases 418,426 (Cir Ct D Mass 1815) (discussing the original ju-
risdiction of Admiralty courts at common law):
[Admiralty courts have] no jurisdiction over torts, offences or injuries, done in ports within
the bodies of counties, notwithstanding the places be within the ebb and flow of the tide;
nor over maritime contracts made within the bodies of counties or beyond sea, although
they are, in some measure, to be executed upon the high seas; nor of contracts made upon
the high seas to be executed upon land, or touching things not in their own nature maritime,
such as a contract for payment of money; nor of any contracts though maritime and made
at sea, which are under seal or contain unusual stipulations; and to complete the ... disabili-
ties ... that the admiralty is not a court of record, and of course has no power to impose a
fine, and that it cannot take a recognizance or stipulation in aid of its general jurisdiction.
15 F.L.Wiswall, Jr., The Development ofAdmiralty Jurisdiction and Practice Since 1800:An
English Study with American Comparisons 4 (Cambridge 1970) (discussing the 1389 Admiralty
Jurisdiction Act's restriction on Admiralty jurisdiction).
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and hypothecation cases. Though maritime contracts contemplated
"thing[s] done upon the sea," they were usually entered into on land
and consequently were outside the scope of Admiralty jurisdiction
recognized in the Act.
In seamen's wage cases, the Act interacted with two other statutes
that regulated the form and timing of seamen's wage transactions. The
first statute required all seamen's wage agreements to be made in
writing." This statute was meant to protect mates and mariners from
being cheated out of their wages." However, the combination of this
statute and the Act could have eliminated mates' and mariners' ability
to bring suit in Admiralty court-and to recover on wage agree-
ments-because most seamen entered into their wage contracts on
land, before voyages began."
The second limitation on seamen's wage cases was a combination
of maritime, statutory, and common law that controlled when mates
and mariners could be paid. The legislature passed a law "to prevent
masters paying seamen above one moiety of their wages due to them
beyond the seas,"' 9 and common law courts held that mates and mari-
ners could not take out insurance on their wages.'
These laws were based on the principle that mates and mariners
forfeited their wages if they left their ships before the completion of
the voyages for which they had been hired.2' The laws did not directly
affect the scope of Admiralty jurisdiction, but they increased the im-
portance of providing mates and mariners with an adequate means of
recovery because they raised the risk that seamen would be cheated
out of all of their wages, instead of merely a portion of them.
In hypothecation cases, the only relevant statute was one that
vested in masters the right to "hypothecate [their ship] for necessaries
... in the course of the voyage." The biggest limitation in hypotheca-
16 Id at 4-5. See Howe v Nappier, 4 Burrow 1944,1947,98 Eng Rep 13 (1766) (noting the
statutory requirement that agreements be in writing).
17 Benzen v Jeffries, 1 Lord Raymond 152,91 Eng Rep 999 (KB 1697) (discussing a statute,
2 Hen 4 cap 11, that required seamen's wage contracts to be in writing).The writing requirement
protected seamen by ensuring that owners and masters did not attempt to modify agreements af-
ter a voyage-in some ways akin to the modem statute of frauds. Additionally, it may have pro-
tected owners by documenting the agreements into which their masters entered. This was par-
ticularly important, given the dangers that mariners faced during voyages.
18 For a general discussion of the effects of statutory writing requirements, see Howe, 4
Burrow at 1950-51.
19 King v Glover, 2 Bosanquet and Puller New Reports 206, 209, 127 Eng Rep 603 (Ex
1806) (relying on the purpose of the underlying statute to distinguish the insurances of wages be-
tween captains and mariners).
20 Id at 209.
21 See The "Pearl," 5 C Robinson 224, 222-25, 165 Eng Rep 756 (Instance Court 1804)
(stating that "the legal consequence of desertion, in willfully quitting the services of the ship, be-
fore her arrival in port, is the forfeiture of wages").
22 Benzen, 1 Lord Raymond at 152 (prohibiting Admiralty jurisdiction over hypothecation
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tion cases was the practical considerations that surrounded hypothe-
cation. Masters entered into hypothecation agreements to obtain ne-
cessities for troubled ships. Thus, by their very nature, hypothecation
contracts were almost always entered into on land, rather than at sea.
If common law courts had stringently adhered to the Act and its
limits on Admiralty jurisdiction to "thing[s] done upon the sea," it
would have had the practical effect of barring masters from bringing
suit in Admiralty court for hypothecation agreements. The King's
Bench recognized this possibility in Benzen v Jeffrie? when it stated,
"as to the objection, that the contract was made upon the land, and
the money paid there; it must of necessity be so, for if a man be in dis-
tress upon the sea, and compelled to go into port, he must receive the
money there, or not at all."'
II. PRESERVATION OF ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION IN SEAMEN'S
WAGE AND HYPOTHECATION CASES
In seamen's wage and hypothecation cases, common law courts
avoided the presumptive result of the Act, which limited Admiralty ju-
risdiction to acts done at sea, and considered the nature of the acts,
not their location. They recognized Admiralty courts' jurisdiction
when certain requirements concerning agreement form and claimant
status were met, even when the courts would have prohibited Admi-
ralty jurisdiction in other types of cases.n Common law courts had the
power to prevent Admiralty courts from exercising-or exceeding-
their jurisdiction by issuing writs of prohibition during a suit for
prohibition that could be brought by either party involved in a non-
common law suit. Common law courts decided whether to grant a
prohibition, forbidding the Admiralty suit from proceeding, after hear-
ing the parties' arguments about whether the case was beyond the
Admiralty court's jurisdiction.n
contract entered into in London, but recognizing masters' right to hypothecate "if his ship be
impaired by tempest, so that he is forced to borrow money to refit, otherwise she will be lost").
23 1 Lord Raymond 152,91 Eng Rep 999 (KB 1697).
24 Id.
25 See Howe v Nappier, 4 Burrow 1944,1950-51,98 Eng Rep 13 (KB 1697).
26 See generally Gray, 1 The Writ of Prohibition (cited in note 7). Prohibition suits could be
initiated by any person generally eligible to bring a lawsuit; one did not have to be a defendant
or have any interest in the suit one sought to arrest. To stop a suit in a non-common law court on
the grounds that it was beyond the court's jurisdiction, the plaintiff-in-prohibition went to the
King's Bench or Common Pleas with his statement of cause. Defendants-in-prohibition had a
right to contest a prohibition by addressing the legal or factual matters of the underlying case or
by challenging the prohibition itself. What a plaintiff-in-prohibition hoped to accomplish if he
succeeded varied with the circumstances. The party may have wanted to escape liability entirely,
to force the other party to bring a new suit at common law, or to secure trial by the common law
method of a jury or decision of legal question by common law judges.
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Writs of prohibition were potentially an extremely potent means
of limiting Admiralty jurisdiction because they provided a mechanism
for common law courts to define the scope of their non-common law
competitors' jurisdiction.' The power that writs of prohibition af-
forded common law courts made the courts' restraint all the more
striking.
The courts recognized this inconsistency and stated that seamen's
wage and hypothecation cases could be brought in Admiralty only by
grace of the common law courts." Common law judges justified pre-
serving Admiralty jurisdiction in these cases by discussing the proce-
dural advantages Admiralty courts provided-such as the fact that
Admiralty courts allowed for in rem and multiparty actions, while
common law courts limited their proceedings to in personam actions
brought by individual claimants.2 Multiparty actions were valuable
because they allowed parties lacking the resources, information, or in-
centives to bring suit on their own to join with other claimants who
were similarly situated. Thus, such actions were akin to modem class
actions.
Admiralty jurisdiction provided a way for common law courts to
facilitate certain types of maritime relationships. The procedural ad-
vantages of Admiralty courts provided seamen with the incentives and
opportunities to enforce wage agreements by making it easier than in
common law courts to collect damages and to bring suit. By providing
these mechanisms, Admiralty courts increased the probability that
wage contracts could be enforced. This was extremely important, par-
ticularly given the fact that maritime relationships were almost en-
tirely based on contracts!'
Admiralty courts also had rules that protected owners from some
of the risk created by giving masters authority over their business op-
erations and contract obligations. These rules helped distribute some
27 As the United States Supreme Court observed in 1827, "[IThe Court of the King's
Bench, by its acknowledged jurisdiction, as exemplified in the very exercise of its power to pro-
hibit, is the very source to which we are to look for lights to determine the respective powers of
the inferior Courts." Ramsay v Allegre, 25 US 611, 621 (1827).
28 See, for example, Holland v Money Arising from the Sale of the "Royal Charlotte;" 1
Burrell 76,77 (Admiralty 1768), in Reginald G. Mardsen, ed, Reports of Cases Determined by the
High Court ofAdmiralty 76,77 (William Clowes and Sons 1885) (discussing dispute arising after
master advanced money to pay seamen's wages after "ship was sold by decree of [Admiralty]
Court").
29 Menetone v Gibbons, 3 Term Rep 267, 267, 100 Eng Rep 568 (KB 1789) (stating that
Admiralty courts "have cognizance of an hypothecation bond given in the course of a voyage,
though it be executed on land and under seal"); Clay v Snelgrave, 1 Lord Raymond 576, 577, 91
Eng Rep 1285 (KB 1700) (stating that "the great reason why they are permitted to sue there is,
the ship is the debtor, and by the law of the Admiralty they may attach her, which they cannot do
by the common law; and in the Admiralty court they may all join in a suit, whereas by the com-
mon law they must bring several actions").
30 See Part I for discussion of the importance of contracts in maritime relationships.
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of the risks created by the unique structure of maritime relationships.
For example, the Admiralty rule that suits could be brought against
masters, ships, and cargo, but not against ship owners themselves, lim-
ited owners' liability to the value of the ship and its cargo."t This
amount was what owners probably, and rationally, would have in-
vested." Another Admiralty rule stated that claimants could attach
masters to Admiralty claims." By making masters personally liable if
they entered into agreements that were worth more than the value of
the ship and its cargo, this rule checked masters' willingness to enter
into unduly burdensome or extravagant contracts.?
Ultimately, Admiralty jurisdiction allowed common law courts to
facilitate certain types of maritime relationships and to define and
limit the authority, rights, and duties of maritime personnel. This rec-
ognition and facilitation was particularly important, given the central
role that contracting had in defining maritime relationships. These
dual concerns are evidenced in the framework common law courts
developed to define Admiralty jurisdiction in both seamen's wage and
hypothecation cases.
A. Seamen's Wage Cases
To determine Admiralty jurisdiction in seamen's wage cases,
common law courts considered the status of the claimants and the
form and substance of the agreements. They recognized Admiralty ju-
risdiction in suits brought by mariners and those that involved ordi-
nary wage contracts, but prohibited Admiralty jurisdiction, and exer-
cised common law jurisdiction, in suits brought by masters or that in-
volved special or sealed agreements. The former distinction can be
understood as a way of facilitating certain types of maritime relation-
ships, while the latter makes sense as a way to check masters' ability to
enter into idiosyncratic and unforeseeable contracts to the detriment
of owners.
31 See, for example, Ross v Walker, 2 Wilson Rep 264 (KB 1765).
32 From a theoretical standpoint, this amount should approximate the optimal level of in-
vestment for owners to make in the ship and its cargo. This level is optimal because ship owners,
like stockholders of a corporation, would desire limited liability when business decisions are be-
ing made by agents (masters or CEOs, respectively) that the owners cannot easily monitor. See
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at § 1 (cited in note 8).
33 See, for example, "The Favorite" 2 C Rob 232,165 Eng Rep 299 (Instance Ct 1799).
34 The fact that masters could be attached to Admiralty cases, but not common law cases,
may have created perverse incentives and encouraged masters to enter into nonstandard agree-
ments to avoid Admiralty jurisdiction and the risk of being attached to a claim. This problem
could not be completely eliminated, but its effects were minimized by the fact that it was difficult
for claimants to maintain common law actions. The difficulty of sustaining common law actions
created an incentive for mates and mariners to monitor masters by ensuring that they entered
into standard agreements and reduced the risk that owners would be charged in common law ac-
tions.
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1. Claimant status: the master-mariner distinction.
Common law courts made sharp and rigid distinctions between
masters, on the one hand, and mates and mariners, on the other, and
severely restricted the ability of the masters to bring suit in Admiralty
courts. They recognized Admiralty jurisdiction when "mariners sue[d]
in the Admiralty for wages ... [even if the agreement] is pleaded to
have been made at land,"'35 but not over "contract[s] made with the
master upon the land."3 Masters, unlike other maritime personnel,
generally had to bring suit in common law court to recover wages. De-
spite its facial simplicity, this distinction was difficult to administer be-
cause it required common law courts to define the categories of mates,
mariners, and masters. These categories, as discussed below, were not
always clearly divided and thus the common law courts also had to de-
termine what to do when claimants did not fit into the typical mold of
mate, mariner, or master.
Common law courts classified a broad range of claimants as
mates or mariners and allowed them to sue in Admiralty courts. Ex-
amples of such individuals include boatswains,7 pilots,* seamen hired
to fit a ship for sea even if the ship never ultimately proceeded upon
the voyage,3 9 mates who were "not in nature ... a mariner, but [were]
to succeed the master, if he died in the voyage," surgeons,41 and car-
penters.42
Common law courts rigidly maintained the distinctions that they
developed. Many cases arose involving claimants who initially served
35 Buck v Atwood, 2 Strange 761, 761, 93 Eng Rep 832 (KB 1727) (refusing to prohibit
Admiralty jurisdiction, despite argument that "deed [was] pleaded to have been made at land").
36 Justin v Ballam, 2 Lord Raymond 805,806,92 Eng Rep 38 (KB 1702) (holding that Ad-
miralty courts did not have jurisdiction over a suit brought by a master regarding a contract
made upon land). See also Clay v Snelgrave, 1 Lord Raymond 576, 576, 91 Eng Rep 1285 (KB
1700) ("The master of a ship cannot sue in the Admiralty for his wages on a contract made on
shore.").
37 Ragg v King, 1 Barnardiston Rep 297, 94 Eng Rep 202 (KB 1729) (discussing suit
brought for wages by a master and boatswain). A boatswain is a petty officer on a merchant ves-
sel who is in charge of rigging, anchors, cables, etc. Gove, ed, Webster's Third New International
Dictionary at 244 (cited in note 4).
38 Ross v Walker, 2 Wilson Rep 264 (KB 1765) (holding that pilots are mariners and can
bring suit in Admiralty court, but granting a writ because the pilot worked within the body of the
country).
39 Wells v Osman, 2 Lord Raymond 1044,92 Eng Rep 193 (KB 1704) (permitting seaman's
suit for wages in Admiralty court).
40 Bayly v Grant, 1 Salkeld 33,33,91 Eng Rep 35 (KB 1701) (holding that a mate of a ship
may sue for wages in Admiralty court). See also Hook v Moreton, 1 Lord Raymond 397,398,91
Eng Rep 1165 (KB 1698) (stating that "it seemed to the Court, that a mate is but a mariner"
when finding that a mate can sue in Admiralty for his wages).
41 Mills v Long, Sayer 136, 96 Eng Rep 829 (KB 1754) (holding that a surgeon of a ship
may sue in Admiralty court).




as mariners and were subsequently promoted to master. Common law
courts allowed claimants who served in dual roles to sue in Admiralty
court for wages they earned as mates or mariners, but not for what
they earned as masters, even when the suit for masters wages "was
only an incident to the other." 3
For example, in Reed v Chapman, the common law court did not
allow the Admiralty court to exercise jurisdiction in a claim for wages
brought by a former mate who took over as master after the original
master of the ship died during the voyage.' The court relied on the
rule that "for wages of mariners or mates of ships the Admiralty Court
shall be allowed jurisdiction, but for wages of masters they shall not"
and allowed Admiralty jurisdiction in the suit for wages earned as a
mariner but not for those as a master.6
Similarly, in The "Favourite,"' the court did not allow the Admi-
ralty court to exercise jurisdiction over a claim brought by a former
mate who became a master when the initial master was taken hostage
by a French privateer. The former master had been unable to dis-
charge several bonds to finance the voyage after the ship was in dis-
tress. The privateer captured the previous master, who was personally
liable for the bonds, and released the ship, and the previous master
asked the claimant to serve as master during the former's detention.
The common law court held that the claimant was "entitled to his
wages as mate, and that he must go elsewhere for the reward of the
additional services performed as master."4
Initially, the dual system of recovery for parties that served as
both mariners and masters does not seem to make sense. It seems like
a waste of judicial and individual resources to require parties to bring
two separate suits to recover their wages. However, the dual system fit
well with the structure of maritime relationships and the fact that mas-
ters contracted directly with owners and oversaw ships' operations.
Common law courts frequently justified allowing mates and
mariners, but not masters, to benefit from Admiralty procedures by re-
ferring to the structure of maritime relationships. They focused on the
fact that masters contracted directly with ship owners, while mates and
mariners were dependent on their masters for wages.
43 Reed v Chapman, 2 Barnardiston Rep 160,160,94 Eng Rep 421 (KB 1732) (prohibiting
Admiralty jurisdiction for wages that the plaintiff who had previously been a mate, earned when
he replaced a master who died during the voyage).
44 2 Barnardiston Rep 160,94 Eng Rep 421 (KB 1732).
45 Id.
46 Id.
47 2 C Rob 232,165 Eng Rep 299 (Instance Ct 1799).
48 Id at 238.
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In Ross v Walker,9 the court stated that pilots were mariners and
could sue in Admiralty court (absent an expired statute of limitations)
because "the master covenants with the owners to find a pilot, and
they to pay him."' The court went on to say that pilots should be able
to sue in Admiralty court "out of compassion to these poor men that
they may all join in the court of Admiralty; they do not know who is
the master, or is to pay them, so they proceed against the ship.""
Similarly, in King v Glover,' one of the justices stated:
Indeed the captain and the mariners are treated as very different
subjects of consideration in the marine law; the former are sup-
posed to be persons of trust and confidence with the owners, and
to be bound to them by the terms of their contract, nor is there
any fear that they will run away or desert; and so far is the idea of
personal trust and confidence between the owners and the mas-
ter carried, that the latter has not, as the mariners have, the
choice of proceeding against the ship in the Admiralty, or suing at
law, but must pursue his remedy at law; moreover he is consid-
ered quasi owner himself, and liable to be tried."'
Likewise, in Wells v Olsman, 4 the justices focused on the differences
between the relationships that mates and masters had with ship own-
ers. One justice described the role of seamen that "they look no far-
ther [than the voyage], they do not concern themselves with the prop-
erty of the ship, nor are privy to the bill of sale, or any other matters
between the master and the builder; and therefore it would be hard
for any thing that passes between the master and the builder to take
away their remedy."55
The distinction that common law courts made between masters
and other maritime personnel makes sense when Admiralty jurisdic-
tion is analyzed as a way to facilitate certain types of contractual rela-
tions. Common law courts were concerned that mates and mariners
would not be allowed to recover if they were not allowed to bring
multiparty or in rem suits, particularly since mates and mariners did
not have any contact with the owners on whose ships they worked.
If mates and mariners were not allowed to bring suit in Admiralty
court, there was a chance that the wage contracts would be unen-
forceable because common law courts did not allow in rem or multi-
49 2 Wilson Rep 264 (KB 1765).
50 Id at 265.
51 Id.
52 2 Bos & Pul (NR) 206,127 Eng Rep 603 (Ex 1806).
53 Id at 210.
54 2 Lord Raymond 1044,1044,92 Eng Rep 193 (KB 1704).
55 Id at 1045 (holding that a seaman hired to fit a ship for sea and go on a voyage may sue
in Admiralty court even though the ship did not ultimately proceed upon the voyage).
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party actions (both of which helped seamen recover). This could seri-
ously disrupt the maritime industry-both by making mates and mari-
ners unwilling to sign contracts on land, which would be extremely in-
convenient, and by allowing owners to externalize costs by cheating
their personnel out of wages.
The same concerns did not exist with masters. Most ships had
only one master, and most masters contracted directly with ship own-
ers. This meant that the primary reasons for allowing mates and mari-
ners to bring suit in Admiralty court did not apply to masters. First,
since there was only one master on a ship, masters did not require, nor
would they benefit from, multiparty actions. Second, since masters'
contracts generally conformed with standard agreements in which the
parties knew one another, the same concerns that supported affording
mates and mariners the protection of in rem actions did not apply.
Common law courts had no reason to allow masters to bring suit in
Admiralty court to recover wages, since allowing such jurisdiction
would not facilitate or support masters' contractual relations.
2. Substance and form requirements.
To determine how to classify claimants, common law courts gen-
erally focused on written agreements, rather than on what jobs the
claimants actually performed. This approach served an evidentiary
function, allowing courts to focus on something tangible and avoid
struggling to sort out contradictory testimony.
Courts often described their classifications in terms of whether
written agreements were parol agreements, which merely supported
standard wage agreements, or whether they were special or sealed
agreements, which contemplated extra or unique obligations. They al-
lowed Admiralty courts to exercise jurisdiction over the former but
not the latter.
The distinction between standard and special agreements is illus-
trated by a comparison between Bens v Parre" and Opy v Child.f In
Bens, the court recognized Admiralty jurisdiction over an agreement
that the petitioner alleged "was made by deed at land"'9 even though
the contract was "by writing, and yet not by deed" on the grounds that
"notwithstanding the writing, it is but a parol contract."59 In contrast,
in Opy, the court stated that Admiralty jurisdiction should be prohib-
ited since "there... [was a] special agreement by which the mariners
... receive[d] their wages in any other manner than is usual; or ... the
56 2 Lord Raymond 1206,92 Eng Rep 296 (KB 1705).
57 1 Salkeld 31,91 Eng Rep 33 (KB 1795).
58 2 Lord Raymond at 1206.
59 Id.
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agreement ... [was] under seal, so as to be more than a parol agree-
ment."
The distinction paralleled the statutory requirement that sea-
men's wage contracts must be in the form of written agreements. By
preserving Admiralty jurisdiction over standard agreements, common
law courts ensured that seamen were not precluded from benefiting
from the procedural advantages of Admiralty courts merely because
they adhered to the statutory requirement that they enter written
wage contracts instead of oral agreements." However, despite this cor-
relation, no clear guidelines existed to differentiate standard and spe-
cial agreements, and it is difficult to derive meaningful distinctions
from these cases because courts generally did not outline the facts that
underlay disputes.
Common law courts emphasized written agreements in a way
that allowed them to protect maritime personnel and owners from
some of the risks caused by the unique structure of maritime relations.
By focusing on written agreements, instead of actual performance, the
courts shielded mates and mariners from some of the problems that
arose between masters and owners. For example, in Wells v Osman, 6
the claimants were "hired to fit a ship for sea and go a voyage in her,'
but the ship never sailed because the agreement between the intended
master and the owners fell through. The court upheld the claimants'
right to "sue in the Admiralty ... tho' she does not proceed upon the
voyage.... [as long as the owner] permit[ted] them to go on board.",
This ensured that maritime personnel would not be penalized for en-
tering into contracts with masters rather than owners, as mandated by
industry practice.
Correspondingly, common law courts also protected owners from
potentially idiosyncratic contracts that masters could develop accord-
ing to their own interests and whims. For example, in The "Mona,"
'
the court held that Admiralty courts did not have jurisdiction over an
agreement in which the claimant agreed to stay with the ship through-
out its voyage and "pull a rope when [the master did]." 6' The court
found that the contract "directly stated, that he was not to be required
to perform a mariner's duty at all," and that "where there is a special
60 1 Salkeld at 31,91 Eng Rep at 33.
61 For a discussion of the procedural advantages, see text accompanying note 29.
62 This difficulty is demonstrated by the impossibility of distinguishing Bens v Parre and
Opy v Child. In both decisions, the courts issued their opinions without outlining the facts. This
lack of description is common in most opinions of this period.
63 2 Lord Raymond at 1044.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 1 W Rob 137,166 Eng Rep 524 (Admiralty 1840).
67 Id at 140.
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agreement differing from the ordinary mariner's contract, [Admiralty]
Court has no power to adjudicate."" This ensured that wage agree-
ments accorded with owners' reasonable expectations and subse-
quently reduced the risks associated with allowing masters to enter
into contracts on owners' behalf
Both Wells and "Mona," despite their different results, protected
mariners and owners from the unprecedented authority that masters
had as a result of the unique structure of maritime relations. This pro-
tection was extremely important. Maritime relationships -which in-
volved the complete separation of ownership, management, and
work-represented a new type of relationship in sixteenth- and seven-
teenth-century England.6 Protections like those in Wells and "Mona"
facilitated these relationships by minimizing some of their costs (and
some disincentives for entering into such relationships).
B. Masters' Hypothecation Cases
Hypothecation cases often arose when ship owners tried to avoid
honoring the agreements that masters entered into to obtain goods
and supplies during a voyage. One such case, Menetone v Gibbons,"
arose after individuals attempted to sell a ship that a master had hy-
pothecated in exchange for providing his ship "with victuals and other
necessaries and materials, for enabling her to prosecute her voyage
with safety.'' The owners argued that the contract was invalid because
it had been created under the master's seal, rather than under the
owner's. However, the court, recognizing the master's authority to en-
ter into hypothecation agreements, held that the plaintiffs had the title
to the ship free and clear.2
In hypothecation cases, common law courts developed an excep-
tion that paralleled the exception in seamen's wage cases to the re-
quirement that Admiralty jurisdiction could only be exercised over
things done upon the sea. The basic rule in such cases was that Admi-
ralty courts had "cognizance of an hypothecation bond given in the
course of a voyage, though it be executed on land and under seal.""
For example, in Menetone, the court upheld Admiralty jurisdiction
(and the Admiralty court determination that the hypothecation con-
tract was valid) even though the hypothecation agreement was en-
tered into on land.4
68 Id at 141.
69 See Part L.A for a discussion of the unique structure of maritime relationships.
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However, the scope of Admiralty jurisdiction in hypothecation
suits was different from the scope of jurisdiction in seamen's wage
cases.7' The primary limitation that common law courts placed on Ad-
miralty jurisdiction in hypothecation cases was the rule that masters
did not have power "to hypothecate the ship in port, before she set
out upon her voyage."7 6 Common law courts treated hypothecation
agreements entered into before the ship went on voyage as standard
contracts and applied the basic guideline that Admiralty courts could
not exercise jurisdiction over contracts that were not "done upon the
sea."
In Justin v Ballam,7 which involved a contract to supply an an-
chor and cable to a distressed ship, the court stated that it did not ap-
pear "that the ship was in her voyage, when she became in distress."
'
8
The court therefore held that
it is true, that by the maratime law every contract with the master
of a ship implies an hypothecation; but it is otherwise by the law
of England. Therefore this being a contract made with the master
upon the land, it is the common case. The admiralty cannot have
cognisance of such a suit."
This differed from seamen's wage agreements, in which common law
courts allowed seamen to bring suit, even for wages the claimant
earned before the voyage began.-
The relative simplicity of hypothecation cases, as compared to
seamen's wage cases, was partly a function of the nature of hypotheca-
tion. Courts did not have to develop fine-tuned distinctions among
maritime personnel because, as a practical and statutory matter, only
masters could hypothecate a ship during its voyage. Additionally,
courts could not practicably limit Admiralty jurisdiction over hy-.
pothecation agreements to standard, unsealed contracts. By their very
nature, hypothecation contracts were special because masters entered
into them out of necessity when a ship was in distress. Moreover, the
third parties with whom such agreements were entered into may have
required them to be under seal, particularly if the masters were un-
known foreigners.
As with seamen's wage contracts, common law courts defined
Admiralty jurisdiction in hypothecation cases in a way that jointly fa-
cilitated and limited masters' ability to enter into such agreements.
75 Id.
76 Lister v Baxter, 2 Strange 695,695, 93 Eng Rep 789 (KB 1729).
77 2 Lord Raymond 805,92 Eng Rep 38 (KB 1702).
78 Id.
79 Id.
80 See note 39.
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Common law courts often justified recognizing Admiralty jurisdiction
over hypothecation contracts by emphasizing the importance of pro-
viding a remedy for contracts that the law explicitly authorized mas-
ters to enter into and that were important to the maritime industry.
For example, in Benzen,'1 the court recognized Admiralty jurisdiction
over a contract in "which the master had hypothecated for necessaries,
being upon the sea in stress of weather."" It stated that "since the
King's Bench cannot do right to the parties, it will not hinder the Ad-
miralty from doing them right. For if the King's Bench allows the hy-
pothecation, and yet denies the remedy, it will be a manifest contradic-
tion.""'
However, common law courts did not allow Admiralty courts to
exercise jurisdiction when masters were in a position to seek authori-
zation from owners before entering into agreements. For example, in
Justin,' the court prohibited Admiralty jurisdiction over a hypotheca-
tion contract that the master entered in port before the voyage began.
This meant that the master could not bring an in rem action, even
though the master "would be without remedy."
The rule that Admiralty jurisdiction was appropriate for hypothe-
cation contracts entered during voyages but not for those entered be-
fore voyages began can be considered as a way to balance the need for
masters to raise money against owners' interest in being consulted.
III. WHY COMMON LAW COURTS PRESERVED
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION
Courts generally described the benefits of Admiralty jurisdiction
by making broad statements about fairness or legislative intent. How-
ever, neither of these explanations fully accounts for the complex
framework common law courts developed to define Admiralty juris-
diction in seamen's wage and hypothecation cases. Ultimately, the
81 1 Lord Raymond 152.
82 Id.
83 Id (deciding action brought under statute 2 Hen 4, cap 11, which created a right to sue
for recovery on hypothecation agreements). As a justice in Menetone stated:
That the master of the ship should have power to take up money on hypothecation for ne-
cessaries for a ship, when she is on the voyage, seems highly necessary.The law has so estab-
lished it, convenience requires it, and the naval power of this country, as far as it depends on
individuals, is concerned in the continuance of it.
3 Term Rep at 269. See also Benzen, 1 Lord Raymond at 152-53 (stating, "[Of] the objection, that
the contract was made upon the land, and the money paid there; it must of necessity be so, for if
a man be in distress upon the sea, and compelled to go into port, he must receive the money
there, or not at all. And if his ship be impaired by tempest, so that he is forced to borrow money
to refit, otherwise she will be lost, and for security of this money he pledges his ship; since the
cause of the pledging arises upon the sea, the suit may well be in the Admiralty Court.").
84 92 Eng Rep 38.
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common law framework suggests that common law courts defined
Admiralty jurisdiction in seamen's wage and hypothecation cases in a
way that supported standard maritime business practices and fostered
productive economic relationships.
A. Common Law Justifications: Fairness and Legislative Intent
A few courts emphasized fairness and suggested that it was im-
portant to ensure that every right had a practicable means of recovery.
For example, in Ross v Walker,n the court discussed the importance of
allowing mates and mariners, who were probably unable to maintain
individual actions, to bring multiparty actions. The court upheld the
distinction between mates and mariners on the grounds that it would
be "very hard" if "40 ... [were] obliged to bring several suits at com-
mon law.""
Other courts emphasized the need to ensure recovery in a way
that was consistent with legislative intent. An example of this limita-
tion is Howe v Nappier,n in which the court cited the statute that di-
rected that "agreements shall be in writing ''n and stated that the legis-
lature "did not mean to take away the Admiralty jurisdiction, so con-
venient to mariners. And surely the mere putting a seal to the agree-
ment in writing ought not to take their jurisdiction away from them. ''n
However, there are problems with both the fairness and legisla-
tive intent arguments. The fairness argument does not explain why
common law courts did not merely modify their own procedures to al-
low multiparty actions or why they developed a complex framework
that did not permit all parties to recover. Likewise, the legislative in-
tent argument is not supported by evidence that the legislature in-
tended to preserve Admiralty jurisdiction in seamen's wages and hy-
pothecation cases. In fact, available evidence regarding legislative in-
tent, involving the political environment and status of common law
courts after the English Revolution, contradicts this argument."
85 2Wilson Rep 264.
86 Id at 265. See note 83 and accompanying text.
87 4 Burrow 1944,98 Eng Rep 13 (1766).
88 Id at 1947.
89 Id.
90 The desire to be fair, and provide easy and effective mechanisms for relief does not ex-
plain why common law courts limited Admiralty jurisdiction (and made it more difficult to re-
cover wages) in a number of cases-such as cases involving masters' wage claims or special,
sealed agreements, and hypothecation agreements that masters entered before voyages began.
For examples of limits, see Reed, 2 Barnardiston Rep 160 (allowing claimant to sue in Admiralty
court for wages earned as a mate or mariner but not for wages earned as a master); "Mona," 1 W
Rob 137 (holding that the Admiralty court did not have jurisdiction over a mariner's claim for
wages founded on a special agreement); Lister v Baxter, 2 Strange 695, 93 Eng Rep 789 (KB
1729) (holding that a master cannot hypothecate the ship before the voyage). See also Part II.
91 Indeed, the political environment during the 1700s supported the holding that the legis-
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B. An Alternative Explanation: Institutional Competence
An alternative explanation for why common law courts preserved
Admiralty jurisdiction in seamen's wages and hypothecation cases is
that common law judges wanted to support standard maritime busi-
ness practices and recognized that Admiralty courts were better
equipped than common law courts to do so.
Common law courts frequently discussed the unique relation-
ships among mates and mariners, masters, and owners in seamen's
wage and hypothecation cases. Examples from this Comment, express-
ing such concern, include Ross, in which the court emphasized that
masters, and not mariners, entered into covenants with owners; King,
in which the court stated that masters and mariners are treated differ-
ently because the former are in a position of trust with the owners,
while there is a fear that mates and mariners will disobey;" Wells, in
which the court focused on the fact that mates and mariners, unlike
masters, looked no further than the voyage and were not part of the
contractual arrangements with the owners;' and Benzen, in which the
court argued that giving masters the right to hypothecate was essential
because of the unique structure of maritime relations. 5
It makes sense that common law courts wanted to respect the
unique structure of maritime relationships in seamen's wage and hy-
pothecation cases. During this period, from after the English Revolu-
tion until the nineteenth century, society began to think that politics
should accommodate business, rather than vice-versa. A number of
scientific discoveries and mechanical inventions increased the impor-
tance of commerce and industry.96 These changes had a profound ef-
fect on England's political and social life and fundamentally trans-
formed the relationship between business and politics. In this context,
the newly created class of capitalists fought against "traditional [me-
dieval legal] restrictions" and sought to "bring the law more closely
into conformity with their economic practices."
lature wanted to limit Admiralty jurisdiction. For a description of the relationship between Ad-
miralty courts and the Executive and the animosity created in Parliament towards Admiralty
courts, see E.S. Roscoe, A History of the Prize Court 41-42 (Lloyd's 1924).
9 2 Wilson Rep at 265.
93 2 Bos & Pul (NR) at 209.
94 2 Lord Raymond at 1044.
95 1 Lord Raymond at 152.
9 Production capacities and industrial relationships were transformed in agriculture, with
new modes of husbandry and breeding and machinery like the drill-plough; in manufacturing,
with new machinery; and in the textile, coal, and transportation industries, with the development
of the steam engine. See William Holdsworth, 11 A History of English Law 390 (London 5th ed
1942).
97 Thomas Wilson, A Discourse Upon Usury 135 (Harcourt Brace R.H.Tawney, ed 1572).
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The suggestion that common law courts were concerned with re-
specting the structure of the maritime industry is further supported by
their willingness to recognize Admiralty jurisdiction. During this pe-
riod, there was a general sense that Admiralty courts were better
equipped to deal with the unique structure and practices of the mari-
time industry.3 Many agreed that the Admiralty process was more ef-
ficient and Admiralty judges were better equipped to decide cases in-
volving contracts made abroad.9
The fact that common law courts refused to prohibit Admiralty
jurisdiction, despite explicit statutory text to the contrary, suggests that
common law courts recognized that there was something unique and
important to protect in the maritime industry. In these cases, common
law courts treated jurisdiction as a flexible concept. They departed
from the text of the Act and defined jurisdiction according to where
maritime contracts were performed, rather than where they were exe-
cuted-even when it meant expanding non-common law jurisdiction
at their own expense."'
By departing from the statutory scheme, the courts allowed mari-
time cases to be heard in courts that were better equipped to deal with
unique aspects of the industry. This delegation enabled the legal sys-
tem to develop a scheme of remedies for seamen's wage and hypothe-
cation cases that supported productive business practices and miti-
gated the risks created by-the structure of maritime relationships.
CONCLUSION
Seamen's wage and hypothecation cases contradict the popular
assumption that common law judges wanted to expand their own
courts' jurisdiction. In these cases, common law judges developed a
complex framework to preserve Admiralty jurisdiction, even though
the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act of 1389, along with numerous statutory
and practical considerations, supported common law jurisdiction. One
98 See, for example, Howe, 4 Burrow at 1945-46 ("we can give the mariners the most effec-
tual remedy in cases of wages. We can send commissions to examine witnesses: which foreign
Courts of Admiralty will assist. Mariners may join together in suing, in our Courts. We examine
our witnesses upon interrogatories: which is convenient to men of that vague kind of life. So that
they have certain and convenient justice in Admiralty-Courts."); Pierce v Hopper, 1 Strange 249,
93 Eng Rep 503 (KB 1720) (declaration for attachment in prohibition).
99 For example, Admiralty courts could examine witnesses abroad, hear in rem proceedings
against ships, and join suits by multiple mariners for wages into a single action. In contrast, com-
mon law courts required separate actions. See note 29 and accompanying text.
100 The concern common law courts demonstrated for maritime relationships can not be
reconciled with the well established model that common law courts were merely concerned with
retaining their own jurisdiction. Common law courts may have recognized Admiralty jurisdiction
in seamen's wages and hypothecation cases merely as a way to be unobtrusive and avoid disrupt-
ing maritime relationships so much that Parliament would repeal the Admiralty Jurisdiction Act
altogether.
1428 [67:1409
2000] Uncommon Preservation 1429
explanation for why common law courts preserved Admiralty jurisdic-
tion is that common law courts wanted to facilitate productive mari-
time relationships. This possibility casts doubt on the notion that
common law judges myopically clung to their own jurisdiction without
considering the benefits of their non-common law counterparts.
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